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chapter 6
Is trope theory a divided house?
Robert K. Garcia
Michael Loux draws an important distinction between ‘tropes’ and ‘trop-
ers’ (Chapter 1, this volume). My aim in this chapter is to explore the
significance of this distinction. Before introducing my main theses, it will
be useful to provide a provisional gloss on the trope/troper distinction as
well as some terminology.
Both tropes and tropers are ‘particularized properties’ in that they
are non-shareable character-grounders. Tropes and tropers are character-
grounders in that it is in virtue of having a trope (troper) that an object is
charactered in some way. For example, it is in virtue of having a sphericity
trope (troper) that an object is spherical. Tropes and tropers are unshareable
in the following general way: Where f is a trope or troper, if f is had by
object O at time t, then nothing wholly distinct from O has f at t. For
example, if distinct spheres a and b exist at t, the sphericity of a and the
sphericity of b are numerically distinct even if they are qualitatively exactly
similar. (In contrast, on a theory of universals, properties are shareable and
the sphericity of a and the sphericity of b are numerically identical.) The
basic difference between tropes and tropers can be put as follows: If the
sphericity of an object is a troper, then the sphericity is itself spherical;
if the sphericity of an object is a trope, then the sphericity is not itself
spherical. In effect, a troper is a singly-charactered object, whereas a trope
is a singly-characterizing property.
According to Loux, the concept of a troper is relatively novel, whereas
the concept of a trope corresponds to what most contemporary philoso-
phers have in mind when they use the term ‘trope.’ I agree that there are
two distinct concepts mapped by this distinction. However, although I pre-
viously held that the concept of a troper is novel, I now think otherwise.1
1 In Garcia (2009) I explore the relative merits of tropes and tropers. Ultimately, I argue that troper
theory is superior to trope theory. Although my working assumption there is that the concept of a
troper is novel, my main arguments do not turn on this assumption.
133
Trim: 228mm × 152mm Top: 11.774mm Gutter: 18.98mm
CUUK2866-06 CUUK2866/Galluzzo ISBN: 978 1 107 10089 3 March 3, 2015 12:6
134 robert k. garcia
As I show below, the notion of a troper is already at play in the literature.
Arguably, in fact, it is the dominant concept of a ‘trope.’ Thus, Loux’s
distinction between ‘trope’ and ‘troper’ is best described as a distinction
between two different concepts of a trope. Regrettably, then, using ‘trope’
and ‘troper’ to label the distinction is potentially misleading. Accordingly,
below I introduce the terms modifier trope (for Loux’s ‘trope’) and module
trope (for Loux’s ‘troper’), and unless further qualified, ‘trope’ and ‘trope
theory’ should be read as neutral between the two trope concepts.
In what follows, I argue that Loux’s distinction has far-reaching signifi-
cance. First, the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy
in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope
theory. Second, the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing
each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged
advantage of trope theory – that by uniquely occupying the middle ground
between its rivals, trope theory is able to ‘recover and preserve the insights
of ’ these views.2 Ultimately, the distinction suggests that trope theory is a
divided house.
In section 1, my aims are to clarify the distinction between two concepts
of a trope and to note the more fundamental distinctions that underwrite
it. I do so by considering the interrelationships between trope bundle the-
ory and two of its rival mono-category non-relational ontologies: austere
nominalism and realist bundle theory. Here I consider the suggestion that
trope bundle theory monopolizes a sweet spot, so to speak, between aus-
tere nominalism and a realist bundle theory, uniquely incorporating the
strengths and avoiding the weaknesses of these rival views. Ultimately, I
argue that there are two fundamentally different trope theories that occupy
that spot. In section 2 I show how distinguishing these theories sours the
sweetness of the spot.
1. Splitting the sweet spot
I will begin this section by detailing the interrelationships between realist
bundle theory, austere nominalism and trope bundle theory. To set the
stage, I start with a preliminary sketch of each of these views. Since it will
be useful to contrast trope bundle theory with these other two traditional
views, I will sketch themfirst. I will then go on to draw two key distinctions.
These distinctions box a logical compass that will serve to introduce the
distinction between module tropes and modifier tropes.
2 This quote is from molnar (2003: 23), who will be discussed below.
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1.1 Interrelationships among mono-category constituent ontologies
Like other so-called constituent ontologies, a realist bundle theory accounts
for the character of concrete objects by taking them to have metaphysical
structure.3 A concrete object is structured in that it is identical with a
bundle of properties, where these properties are construed as universals.
There have been recent defenders (e.g. O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover
1998) of this view, but the Bertrand Russell of An Inquiry Into Meaning
and Truth (1940) is perhaps its most well-known exponent. Note that
according to this view, concrete objects have metaphysical constituents,
and all of these constituents are universals.
In contrast, the austere nominalist denies that properties exist. On her
view, there exist only concrete objects like persons, potatoes, or electrons.
In addition, she insists that an adequate account of the character of these
objects can be had within this limited explanatory framework. Indeed,
she limits herself to only one explanatory resource: the concrete object
itself, taken as a whole – that is, taken as a metaphysically unstructured,
simple, entity. She holds that we can account for the character of a concrete
object without postulating properties of any sort – whether particularized
properties (tropes), immanent (Aristotelian) universals, or transcendent
(Platonic) universals. This sort of view has been attributed to W. V. O.
Quine (1954) and has recent defenders (e.g. Devitt 1980; Parsons 1999).
According to the austere nominalist, if we want a truthmaker for the
sentence ‘This apple is red,’ we need only point to the apple itself, qua
metaphysical simple.
Trope bundle theory is said to strike an advantageous compromise
between the above rival ontologies. Philosophers typically said to defend
this view include D. C. Williams (1953), Keith Campbell (1990), Peter
Simons (1994), Douglas Ehring (1997, 2011), and Anna-Sofia Maurin
(2002). Some of its usual doctrines are as follows: There are properties.
Properties are tropes – they are particulars (where ‘being a particular’
is subject to some ambiguity, but usually means something like ‘not
multiply-instantiable’ or ‘not possiblywholly located inmore than one non-
overlapping place at the same time’). Properties are fundamental meta-
physical constituents of concrete objects. Every metaphysical constituent
is a property. And, a concrete object is charactered as it is in virtue of
having properties as metaphysical parts.4
3 See Garcia (2014b) for a recent discussion of bundle theory and Loux (2006a) for a discussion of the
distinction between a constituent ontology and relational ontology.
4 One of themost promising versions of trope bundle theory is the so-calledNuclear Theory developed
by Simons (1994) and Keina¨nen (2011). See Garcia (2014c) for discussion.
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Both realist bundle theory and trope bundle theory affirm the existence
of properties. On trope bundle theory, however, a property is not possi-
bly multiply-instantiated. If there are two distinct round balls, the trope
theorist insists that there are two numerically-distinct roundness tropes,
one in (or for) each ball. Indeed, on her view, tropes are the only kind of
constituents that go together (via ‘compresence’) to make up a concrete
object. But tropes also go together (via similarity) to make up ersatz uni-
versals, or property-classes – sets of resembling tropes. These sets serve to
provide semantic values for abstract singular terms, such as ‘redness’ and
‘triangularity.’ The latter, for example, would name the set of tropes that
resemble in being triangularities. More on this below.
Having noted the interrelationships between the above views, we can
now consider an alleged virtue of trope bundle theory. According to some
prominent trope theorists, one advantage of trope theory derives from that
fact that it uniquely holds the middle ground between rival mono-category
ontologies. Maurin’s comments are representative:
To put it simply, when one considers the problems that have faced attempts
to develop one-category ontologies without tropes one finds that, at least
prima facie, these do not seem to be problems that a theory incorporating
only tropes would ever have to face. Classical one-category nominalists –
nominalists, that is, who postulate only the existence of particular concrete
objects [i.e. austere nominalists] – run into trouble when trying to account
for what we refer to as the ‘properties’ of these objects. It is as if concrete
objects are simply too unstructured and too concrete to be the ultimate
constituents of the world. One category universal-realists [realist bundle
theorists] on the other hand, who postulate only the existence of universals,
seem to run into trouble when trying to handle the world’s concrete ingre-
dients. The fundamental entities postulated by the universal-realist simply
turn out to be too universal to allow us to deal with the apparent existence
of concrete objects. Trope theory seems to fill the gap between these two
positions. The trope is particular and thus suitable for dealing with concrete
objects, but it is also qualitative and thus suitable for dealing with properties.
All of this indicates that the prospects of a one-category trope theory are
unusually good. (2002: 6)
Others have expressed similar thoughts about the virtues of trope theory.5
The general claim here seems to be this: Trope theory is superior to both
austere nominalism and realist bundle theory because its account of con-
crete objects incorporates the strengths while avoiding the weaknesses of
these views.
5 E.g. molnar (2003: 23) and Beebee et al. (2011: 256).
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Maurin’s argument merits closer scrutiny. On her view, the problem
with realist bundle theory is that its ‘fundamental entities . . . simply turn
out to be too universal to allow us to deal with the apparent existence
of concrete objects.’ The merits of this claim depend on what Maurin
means by ‘concrete’ object. Although it is not entirely clear, presumably
her thought is that objects are ‘concrete’ in that they are particulars, that
is, not the sort of thing that can be wholly multiply-located. For example,
at this moment this sheet of paper is wholly here and nowhere else. Yet,
the realist bundle theorist tells us that a concrete object is nothing but a
bundle of universals – each of which can be wholly multiply-located. Thus,
on this reading, the problem with realist bundle theory is the difficulty
of seeing why a bundle entirely comprised of wholly-multiply-locatable
entities would not itself be wholly-multiply-locatable. The problem would
be that universals do not provide a realist bundle theory with adequate
resources to ground the particularity of concrete objects. Thus, the trouble
with realist bundle theory is that it takes all of the constituents in a bundle
to be universals, even though the bundle itself is supposed to be a particular.
In contrast, trope bundle theory takes all of the constituents in a bundle
to be particulars; so it is no surprise that the bundle itself is a particular.
So trope bundle theory fares better than realist bundle theory when it
comes to grounding the particularity of concrete objects. Like trope theory,
however, austere nominalism does not founder on particularity. It takes par-
ticularity to be a primitive fact about concrete objects and denies that those
objects have any metaphysical parts – much less any universal parts which
might threaten the particularity of the object. The trouble with austere
nominalism concerns whether it can adequately account for phenomena
attending the character of concrete objects. Indeed, there are reasons to
think that austere nominalism is weak on this score. In large part, the
trouble for the austere nominalist stems from her refusal to posit anything
besides concrete objects, qua metaphysical simples. On the one hand, she
refuses to postulate any immanent metaphysical structure – thereby reject-
ing a so-called constituent ontology. And on the other hand, she refuses to
postulate any non-immanent, namely transcendent, sources of character –
thereby rejecting a so-called relational ontology. The trope bundle theo-
rist, in contrast, accounts for character by adopting a constituent ontology
on which the concrete object has particular characteristics – tropes – as
metaphysical parts.
Nevertheless, both austere nominalism and realist bundle theory have
strengths, and it is said that these strengths are incorporated by trope
bundle theory. According to George Molnar, what is right about austere
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nominalism is that it abstains from the ‘needlessly reificatory move [of
postulating] non-particulars over and above the particulars’ (2003: 24).
And, what is right about realism is that ‘[b]y including properties among the
irreducible contents of this world, realism allows us to construct the robust
explanations, of the facts of predication, of causation, or nomological
connection, etc., that are blocked by [austere] nominalism’ (2003: 24).
The trope bundle theorist is supposed to uniquely preserve what is right
about these views. First, she takes the basic entities to be properties (like
universals) but particular (unlike universals but like the concrete objects
of the austere nominalist). And second, she takes concrete objects to be
structured (unlike those of the austere nominalist) out ofmore basic entities
(like the objects on a realist bundle theory).
1.2 Two kinds of trope theory
So trope theory is said to be unique in its ability to salvage the insights
of both realist bundle theory and austere nominalism (Molnar 2003: 23).
However, the idea that trope bundle theory monopolizes a sweet spot
between its rival mono-category ontologies is called into question by Loux’s
distinction between tropes and tropers, or what I will call modifier tropes
and module tropes, respectively. The distinction shows that between realist
bundle theory and austere nominalism there are two fundamentally dif-
ferent trope theories. This, I will argue, shows that the alleged sweetness
of the spot occupied by trope theory is illusory, the result of conflating
module tropes and modifier tropes.
We can see that there is room for two concepts of a trope by draw-
ing two traditional and fundamental distinctions: the particular/universal
distinction and the object/property distinction. Unfortunately, conflicting
terms have often been used to label these distinctions and sometimes a
single term has been used to range over more than one relevant concept. In
what follows, I have chosen what I take to be appropriate labels, but I am
not so much concerned to defend their aptness as the genuineness of the
distinctions they label. As we will see, both kinds of tropes are supposed to
be particular. Thus, for the sake of getting clear on the distinction between
them, it is less important to get clear on the particular/universal distinction
than it is to get clear on the object/property distinction.
In the literature, the particular/universal distinction is usually drawn
in terms of whether something can be multiply-located. On this view,
universals are possibly wholly multiply-located at non-overlapping places
at the same time, whereas particulars are not (cf. Campbell 1990: 12 and
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O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover 1998: 211–12). I will continue to use the
distinction in this way.
The object/property distinction concerns what J. A. Cover and John
O’Leary-Hawthorne call ‘impredicability – on which condition an indi-
vidual substance is not said of (does not inhere in) anything in the way that
properties are said of (inhere in) substances’ (1999: 11). One might say that
this distinction marks the difference between the subjects of our discourse
and what we say about them. However, putting the distinction this way
can mislead one into thinking that the distinction is a linguistic one, or
is at least justified only by an appeal to the structure or use of language.
Loux’s gloss on the distinction is not misleading in this way; according to
Loux, the object/property distinction maps the categorial gap between a
property and a property-possessor (Chapter 1, this volume). Unfortunately,
this construal also needs some refinement.
First, it won’t do to say that an object is simply a property-possessor.
Arguably, if there are properties, some properties are themselves property-
possessors. For example, it is reasonable to think that if there is such a thing
as redness, then redness has the property of being a color. At the very least,
the object/property distinction should accommodate those ontologies on
which there are such higher-order properties. (Thus, first-order properties
which have higher-order properties are not genuine objects, though they
function like objects with respect to those higher-order properties.)
There is a second, more important worry about Loux’s gloss on the
distinction. His notion of a ‘property-possessor’ might suggest that it is
impossible that there be objects but no properties. But, at least for our
purposes, the distinction should not have this implication, since it would
thereby beg the question against the austere nominalist. The latter will insist
that her ontology is entirely populated by objects, where those objects are
truly charactered even though there are no properties, or characteristics,
per se. In other words, the austere nominalist claims that there are objects
but no properties. This point is especially crucial for understanding the
concept of a module trope. As we will see, in an important sense both
the austere nominalist and the module trope theorist deny that there are
properties while affirming that there are charactered objects.
Fortunately, there is a way to draw the distinction that should suit
our purposes. Traditionally, some metaphysicians have taken the concept
of a property to be a basic one, typically introduced via ostension. We
are invited to consider, say, the hard and smooth apple on the table. We
notice its hardness and smoothness as distinct from that which is itself
hard and smooth. That is, we notice the properties, or characteristics, of
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the apple and we notice the thickly charactered apple. The latter is not
a characteristic, or property, but a charactered, or propertied, thing – an
object. And so we arrive at the relevant conceptual distinction. On the one
hand, there is the concept of a property (characteristic, quality, etc.). And,
on the other hand, there is the concept of something which is charactered
but not itself a property or characteristic. I will call the latter the concept of
an object.
This way of drawing the distinction allows the austere nominalist to
affirm that only objects exist. In addition, this gloss on the distinction does
not entail that a property cannot itself be charactered. It is consistent with
there being some sense in which sphericity is a shape, courage is a virtue,
etc.
The goal so far has been to draw attention to two important distinctions –
the universal/particular distinction and the object/property distinction.
These distinctions generate the following four complex notions: universal-
property, particular-property, particular-object, and universal-object. Thus,
the object/property and universal/particular distinctions box the following
logical compass:
Particular Universal
Object
Property
Box 1
Particular-objects
Box 3
Universal-objects
Box 2
Particular-property
Box 4
Universal-property
I will refer to this compass to note the basic differences between austere
nominalism, realist bundle theory, modifier trope theory, andmodule trope
theory. I will first note the agreements and disagreements between austere
nominalism and modifier trope theory. I will then discuss module trope
theory and show how it falls in the theoretical space between the latter two
views.
The basic agreement between austere nominalism and modifier trope
theory can be put in terms of the universal/particular distinction. Both
views agree that the universal side of this distinction necessarily has an
empty extension. They thereby endorse strict particularism, the doctrine
that, necessarily, there are only particulars. So they agree that Boxes 3
and 4 are empty. However, while the austere nominalist and the modifier
trope theorist agree that there are only particulars, they disagree on what
kinds of particulars there are. The austere nominalist insists that among
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the particulars there are only objects, whereas the modifier trope theorist
thinks that among the particulars there are both objects and properties.
In other words, the austere nominalist thinks that Boxes 2, 3, and 4 are
empty, whereas the modifier trope theorist thinks that only Boxes 3 and 4
are empty.
For the austere nominalist, all entities fall into Box 1 and are primi-
tively thickly intrinsically charactered, in that each can be described in
a multitude of ways. Supposing that a given ball is a particular, the ball
will be said to be of a certain color, size, and shape – it is thus a thickly
intrinsically charactered object. (Of course, the austere nominalist will, ex
hypothesi, deny that she is thereby committed to there being either prop-
erties expressed by those predicates or some sort of metaphysical structure
in the ball.)
For the modifier trope bundle theorist, the entities in Box 1 are somehow
constructed out of the metaphysically more basic entities in Box 2. That
is, the particular-objects are entirely constituted by particular-properties,
or, more specifically, by particular fully-determinate characteristics. With
respect to the ball, a modifier trope theorist might say that the ball has
numerous constituent properties, such as scarlet-redness and sphericalness
– which, along with the ball’s other tropes, together thickly characterize
the object.
We can now see that there are two primary differences between austere
nominalism and modifier trope theory, and that these differences turn
on the object/property distinction. First, whereas the austere nominalist
denies that there are properties, the modifier trope theorist claims that
there are properties and that properties constitute the metaphysical ground
floor of being. Second, while both views affirm that there are objects,
objects are metaphysically basic on austere nominalism, whereas objects
are metaphysically constructed (out of tropes) and hence derivative on
modifier trope theory. The basic entities of the austere nominalist are
particulars, but they are also objects – they are charactered things but
not characteristics. The basic entities of the modifier trope theorist are
particulars but not objects – they are characteristics. For the modifier
trope theorist, every object is ‘constructed’ entirely out of basic particulars,
namely out of particular properties. Specifically, an object is a bundle of
compresent tropes. It is thus apt to describe amodifier trope as a ‘maximally-
thinly characterizing particular,’ since each modifier trope endows the
object (of which it is a constituent) with a single specific fully-determinate
characteristic. Or, put differently, each modifier trope characterizes an
object in a single fully-determinate way. For example, on the modifier view
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of tropes, if an object is spherical it is so in virtue of having a sphericity
trope as a constituent – where that sphericity is not itself spherical.
So much for contrasting austere nominalism and modifier trope theory.
We are now in a position to consider module trope theory, which occupies
the theoretical turf between the latter two views. In fact, as we will see,
module trope theory is closer in spirit to austere nominalism than is mod-
ifier trope theory. What I am here calling a module trope Loux introduces
under the term ‘troper’:
one might propose a nominalistic ontology that has as its metaphysical
atomswhat wemight call ‘tropers.’Whereas tropes are particular properties –
things like this redness, this triangularity, this pallor, tropers are thin indi-
viduals – things like this individual red thing, this individual triangular thing,
and this individual pale thing. The claim would be that familiar objects are
bundles of compresent tropers. (Chapter 1, this volume)
To fix on the concept of a module trope (troper), recall Box 1, which
represents the concept of a particular-object. A module trope is a basic
entity that would fall into Box 1. However, a module trope is not the
thickly-charactered object of the austere nominalist. Rather, a module trope
is a singly- or maximally-thinly charactered object.
We can get a better handle on the notion of a module trope by con-
sidering the upshot of austere nominalism’s failure. For a philosopher who
concedes this failure but wants to provide an adequate account of the char-
acter of concrete objects, the natural move is to expand one’s explanatory
resources by appealing to something besides the concrete object itself, taken
as a metaphysically unstructured whole. Thus, one way to characterize the
difference between the two versions of trope theory is in terms of the
extent of their response to austere nominalism’s failure. In short, a module
trope theorist responds by taking one step away from austere nominalism,
whereas a modifier trope theorist takes an additional, second step.
The first step the modifier trope theorist takes is to adopt a constituent
ontology: she posits metaphysical constituents within the concrete object.
The second step she takes is to construe these constituents as belonging to
a different category than that of the whole, or concrete object. She takes
the constituents to belong to the category of property. In effect, this is a
significantly bigger step away from austere nominalism than the first, since
it concedes something to the traditional realist: that the category of property
needs to be populated after all. Indeed, this second step opens a categorial
gap between the concrete individual qua object and its constituents qua
properties. Although this is not the place to discuss them, arguably this
sort of gap raises challenges for a modifier trope theory (for discussion see
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Garcia 2009 and MS a), and it is precisely this sort of gap that worries
Loux in the above citation.
In contrast, the module trope theorist takes only one step away from
austere nominalism. She, like the modifier trope theorist, adopts a con-
stituent ontology and thus posits metaphysically more basic constituents
out of which concrete objects are constructed. But unlike the modifier
trope theorist, she does this without the concession to the realist – without
taking the further step of construing those constituents as properties. Instead,
the basic constituents are objects. To be sure, these are not the thickly
charactered objects of commonsense – rather, we might describe them
as one-dimensionally-charactered objects or maximally-thinly-charactered
objects. But module tropes are objects nonetheless. And, in an important
respect, a module trope is like the objects of the austere nominalist – each
is a charactered object and not a characteristic. In other words, the austere
nominalist and the module trope theorist both refuse to populate any box
other than Box 1. Note that the single step taken by the module trope
theorist does not seem to open a categorial gap between a concrete object
and its constituents – both are objects, both are from Box 1. Rather, their
difference is one of degree, in terms of the thickness of their character. By
way of comparison, note that the basic particulars of the austere nominal-
ist are also objects – they are charactered things which are not themselves
characteristics. But the basic particulars of the modifier trope theorist are
not objects – they are properties or characteristics (this is consistent with
properties ‘having’ formal character such as being particular or being a
property). Thus, while austere nominalism and module trope theory agree
that all entities fall into Box 1, the latter theorist would say that some
members of Box 1 are constituted by other members of Box 1. On mod-
ule trope theory, while everything is a particular-object, concrete objects
(thickly-charactered particular-objects) are constituted by module tropes
(thinly-charactered particular-objects). It is in this sense that module trope
theory has the virtue of being closer in spirit to austere nominalism than
modifier trope theory. In virtue of eschewing properties altogether, module
trope theory is a more thoroughgoing form of nominalism than modifier
trope theory. (Indeed, elsewhere I argue that module trope theory threatens
to collapse into austere nominalism.6)
To flesh out these differences, consider how a trope bundle theory looks
on each way of thinking about tropes. Consider what we would ordinarily
describe as two hard spheres. Call themOrbo and Orba. On both theories,
each of these objects is entirely composed of tropes. For example, Orbo
6 See Garcia (MS b).
Trim: 228mm × 152mm Top: 11.774mm Gutter: 18.98mm
CUUK2866-06 CUUK2866/Galluzzo ISBN: 978 1 107 10089 3 March 3, 2015 12:6
144 robert k. garcia
has hardness1 and sphericity1, whereas Orba has hardness2 and sphericity2
(the subscripts serve as a reminder that these are non-shareable character-
grounders). And, on both theories, Orbo and Orba are similarly shaped
in virtue of sphericity1 and sphericity2 being exactly similar. The theories
differ as follows. On the one hand, modifier trope theory has it that
sphericity1 is not itself spherical and hardness1 is not itself hard. More
generally, none of the character-grounding constituents in Orbo is itself an
object. Instead, these constituents somehow go together (via ‘compresence’)
to form an object. Thus, on modifier trope theory, objects do not exist
at the ground floor of being. On the other hand, module trope theory
has it that sphericity1 is spherical and hardness1 is hard. Thus, Orbo is
composed entirely of basic thinly-charactered objects including whatmight
be more accurately described, following Loux, as spherical-thing1 and hard-
thing1. In addition, Orbo is a non-basic object: It is an object because its
parts are objects, but it is a non-basic object because it is charactered
derivatively, in virtue of its constituents being (primitively) charactered.
Thus, on module trope theory, ordinary, thickly-charactered objects have
their character derivatively, in virtue of the primitively thinly-charactered
objects that occupy the ground floor of being.7
2. Souring the sweet spot
So far I have argued that there are two fundamentally different trope
theories occupying the theoretical space between austere nominalism and
realist bundle theory. The distinction between module tropes and modifier
tropes calls into question the claim sometimes made on behalf of trope
theory – namely, that by uniquely occupying the sweet spot between
its rivals, trope theory is able to ‘recover and preserve the insights of ’
these views. In the first two sections of section 2 I will argue that the
sweetness of this spot is soured by being split between module trope theory
7 An insightful referee asked whether spherical-thing1 is aptly characterized as non-hard, and if so,
whether it would follow that Orbo is derivatively non-hard, as well. This is an important and probing
question. Arguably, a module trope theorist will want to affirm that spherical-thing1 is non-hard
on pain of thickening up the module trope’s primitive character to the point of collapsing module
trope theory into austere nominalism (more on this below). But presumably, she needs to deny that
spherical-thing1’s being non-hard entails that Orbois non-hard. The difficulty here stems from the
fact that such a module trope theorist needs to affirm both of the following general claims, where t
is a module trope had by object O: (i) O is derivatively charactered in virtue of t’s being primitively
charactered; and (ii) It is not the case that every true description of t’s primitive character also truly
describes O. However, affirming both (i) and (ii) seems to require that there is a principled way to
distinguish between the trope level character that is conferred to the object (e.g. being spherical) and
the trope level character that is not conferred to the object (e.g. being non-hard, being metaphysically
simple, etc.). Whether such a distinction can be drawn in a principled way is beyond the scope of
this chapter. Nevertheless, the difficulty here seems significant.
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and modifier trope theory. To do so I will discuss two projects that have
been central to the development of trope theory, what Maurin calls the
construction of things (in section 2.1) and the construction of property classes
(in section 2.2). With respect to each issue, I aim to show two things. First,
the distinction between module tropes and modifier tropes throws into
relief a widespread discrepancy and ambiguity within trope theory. And
second, disambiguation results in a clearer picture of the unique challenges
facing each version of trope theory.
2.1 Challenges concerning the construction of things
I now turn to issues concerning a trope-theoretic account of concrete
objects, or ‘things.’My aim here is twofold. First, I aim to show that because
trope theorists have been less than clear about the role(s) that substrata are
supposed to play on rival ontologies, there is a resulting ambiguity con-
cerning the concept of a trope – an ambiguity that maps onto the modifier/
module distinction. Second, drawing this distinction shows that the result-
ing trope theories have different strengths and weaknesses when it comes to
the task of ‘thing-construction.’ Indeed, each view seems to face significant
challenges and that these challenges have been obscured by conflating the
two kinds of tropes.
Keith Campbell has argued that an ontology of tropes can do without
bare particulars. The argument is that bare particulars are both unde-
sirable and unnecessary. They are undesirable because they are thought
to be mysterious and/or paradoxical. They are thought to be unneces-
sary on the grounds that whatever role they are supposed to play can be
played by tropes. Call the latter claim the Parity Thesis. Arguably, the
Parity Thesis is interesting only if accompanied by the thesis that tropes
are metaphysically simple. Maurin (2002: 101–15), at any rate, appears to
concede this point (though see John Bacon (1995: 2), who seems to want
to remain neutral on it). Call the thesis that tropes are simple the Sim-
plicity Thesis. As Chris Daly (1997) has argued, unless a trope is simple,
a bare particular-cum-universal complex would count as a trope, in which
case trope theory fails to represent a genuine alternative to rival views.
Indeed, the theoretical advantage of trope theory is said to consist in the
fact that what the realist takes to be a complex consisting of a bare par-
ticular tied to a universal (categorially different entities playing distinct
roles), the trope theorist takes to be a simple trope (a single entity playing
multiple roles). This prima facie advantage is enjoyed by trope theory only
if tropes are simple. At any rate, I will assume the Simplicity Thesis in what
follows.
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By way of the Parity Thesis, the trope theorist assigns to the simple
trope various roles played by the items in the realist’s bare particular-cum-
universal complex. In this way, the concept of a trope has been introduced
and partly defined in terms of the roles that bare particulars are supposed
to play. Unfortunately, however, there are discrepancies concerning what
these roles are supposed to be. This results in an ambiguity concerning the
nature of a trope. Resolving the ambiguity yields the distinction between
modifier tropes and module tropes.
Campbell’s writing is not always sensitive to the distinction between
the two kinds of tropes. His language sometimes suggests that he had
modifier tropes in mind. For example, Campbell is comfortable illustrating
his theory by talking about a courageousness trope and a being a bamboo
eater trope. But it is hard to see how these even could be module tropes.
If they were, the courageousness trope would itself be disposed to perform
heroic deeds in certain circumstances, and the being a bamboo eater trope
would itself be able to savor and munch plants. Nevertheless, on the
whole, the thematic concept in Campbell’s writings is that of a module
trope. And Campbell has confirmed this interpretation in conversation.8
One interesting placewhereCampbell can be (mis)read as positingmodifier
tropes is his defense of the Parity Thesis. He says that substrata are supposed
to play only one role, that of particularizing. As we will see, this leads
naturally to thinking of tropes as modifier tropes. In the context of the
following passage, Campbell is comparing trope bundle theory to a rival
two-category constituent ontology that takes an object to be constituted
by a bare particular and universals. On such a view, the bare particular
plays a crucial role of grounding the particularity of the object, a role
that cannot be played by its universals. Campbell argues that trope theory
improves on such a view because the particularizing role can be played by
the constituent properties (because they are particulars), thus making bare
particulars unnecessary:
A [bare particular] is a specialist at particularity: it is introduced into theory
as that which performs the particularizing role and no other . . . Tropes
are particular, but not bare particulars. Their role is dual: to be particular
natures. (1990: 58)
As is made clear by the rest of this passage, Campbell is thinking of partic-
ularity in the sense of being non-repeatable (i.e. non-multiply-instantiable,
or non-shareable), or having a unique dimensional location (here under-
stood broadly, so as to include location either in time and space or in some
8 I thank John Heil for discussing this issue with Campbell for me.
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analogue to time and space). Thus, Campbell is arguing that if constituent
properties are particular, then they can ground both the character and the
particularity of the ordinary object – and so the uneconomical and embar-
rassing bare particular is unnecessary. On this understanding of substrata,
they are only supposed to play one role – that of particularizing. The Par-
ity Thesis, then, amounts to the claim that because tropes are particular
properties, they ground the fact that a bundle of tropes is non-repeatable.
Thus, on this understanding of substrata, if a trope is to be thought of
as a simplified substrata-cum-universal complex, then tropes are simple
non-repeatable properties, or modifier tropes.
It is true that some philosophers who have taken an ordinary object to be
constituted by universals and a substratum have posited the latter in order
to ground the particularity of the object. However, there is another reason
philosophers have postulated substrata: in order to provide an ultimate
subject for properties, an entity that is characterized by properties. The idea
here is that unless there is, in a complex, a non-property constituent
that is non-derivatively or fundamentally charactered by the constituent
properties in that complex, the complex itself cannot be even derivatively
charactered in the ways specified by those constituent properties. A bare
particular is supposed to play this role; in terms of the above property/object
distinction, a bare particular is an object – it is a charactered non-property.
The claim that a bare particular is characteredmight sound surprising, if not
contradictory, since it is widely assumed that a bare particular is supposed
to be something that essentially has no properties. But this assumption
is mistaken, and arguably traces back to a footnote (!) by Wilfred Sellars
(1963a: 282, fn. 1) in which bare particulars are caricatured in this way.9
However, the bareness of a bare particular is supposed to lie in the fact
that there is no property that it has essentially, not that it essentially has
no property whatsoever. In addition, the bareness of a bare particular does
not entail that a bare particular fails to satisfy any description. Rather,
the predicates necessarily satisfied by a bare particular hold primitively, in
that they do not name reified properties. Thus, the predicates ‘being a
bare particular,’ ‘being such as to have no property essentially’ (etc.) do
not name properties. J. P. Moreland and Timothy Pickavance (2003) have
developed a theory of bare particulars along these lines. But the point here
is not to defend the coherence of bare particulars.10 Rather, the point is
9 For a defense, see Garcia (2014a) and Pickavance (2014).
10 Sellars argues that the sentence ‘Universals are exemplified by bare particulars’ is self-contradictory,
and that this becomes evident as soon as we translate it into logical notation. The sentence then
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that Campbell is mistaken in thinking that bare particulars are supposed to
perform ‘the particularizing role and no other.’ There is another role that
bare particulars are supposed to play – namely, that of the non-property
haver of properties, which has properties in the sense of being characterized
by them. The thought being that, for example, where the sphere is there
is more than just sphericalness, there is also something that is spherical,
something charactered in a spherical way.
In sum, there are at least two roles which bare particulars have been
employed to play: First, a bare particular in a bare particular-cum-universal
complex is supposed to render the complex non-repeatable (i.e. non-shareable
or non-multiply-instantiable). Second, a bare particular in a bare particular-
cum-universal complex is supposed to be characterized by the universal in
that complex. The upshot is this. According to the Parity Thesis, tropes
can play whatever roles bare particulars can play. Thus, if we think bare
particulars play only the first role, then, via the Parity Thesis, we are led to
think of tropes as modifier tropes. On this line of thought, for example,
a sphericity trope is particular only in the sense that it is non-shareable
property. However, if we think bare particulars play both roles, then, via the
Parity Thesis, we are led to think of a trope as both a non-shareable entity
and (via the Simplicity Thesis) a primitively charactered entity – a module
trope. On this line of thought, a sphericity trope is particular in that it is
itself a (merely-) spherical-object.
To sum up, Campbell assigns to the simple trope various roles played
by the bare particular in a bare particular-cum-universals complex. In this
way, the concept of a trope has been introduced and/or partly defined in
terms of the roles that bare particulars are supposed to play. However, there
are discrepancies concerning what these roles are supposed to be. The result
is an ambiguity that resolves into the distinction between module tropes
and modifier tropes and which represents two versions of trope theory.
We are now in a better position to get a sense for how these versions have
different strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the task of ‘thing-
construction.’
As noted, an important role that bare particulars have been assigned is
that of being that which is characterized or propertied. And it seems clear that
somethingmust play this role, otherwise, nothing would be (say) spherical.
On pain of failing to account for the seemingly Moorean fact that there are
becomes (x)[(!φ)(φ x) " ¬(!φ)(φ x)], which means ‘If a particular exemplifies a universal, then
there is no universal which it exemplifies’ – a self-contradictory statement. This quotation is from
Sellars (1963a).The logical notation is fromRobert Baker (1967: 211–12) and is different from Sellars’
only in style.
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charactered entities, a trope theorist who rejects bare particulars is under
significant pressure to take tropes to play this role. That is, she is under
pressure to take a trope to be a simple which plays the role of that which is
characterized by a property, thereby construing a trope as a metaphysically
simple, singly-propertied-object, ormodule trope. This theoretical pressure
seems to be noticed by David Armstrong:
An important advantage that [a modifier tropes plus substrata] position
has over a bundle of tropes account is that it gets us away from the idea
that properties [tropes, in this case] are like things. Properties exist, they
are entities, but they are not things. Rather they are ways that things are.
(1997b: 25)
As my bracketed insertions suggest, in this passage I take Armstrong to have
in mind a theory on which modifier tropes are accompanied by substrata, a
view he takes to have the advantage of not construing tropes as objects (i.e.
taking tropes to be module tropes). Accordingly, for a trope theorist who
takes tropes to be modifier tropes, tropes do not play the second role noted
above for bare particulars. Tropes are the characteristics, or properties,
rather than the entities that are characterized, or propertied. But if tropes
do not play the second role, then presumably some other kind of entity
does. Thus, a modifier trope theorist faces significant pressure to accept
something like bare particulars or substrata.
The upshot is that the trope theorist seems to face a choice between two
views:
(TT1) Taking tropes to be module tropes unaccompanied by bare
particulars.
(TT2) Taking tropes to be modifier tropes accompanied by bare
particulars.
The numbers in the acronyms represent the fact that TT1 is a 1-category
ontology, whereas TT2 is a 2-category ontology.
With respect to TT1, opting for module tropes has the advantages of
making bare particulars unnecessary and avoiding a poly-category ontology.
However, as I will discuss below, this view is not without costs. We will see
that it is precisely the assumption that tropes are module tropes that makes
them vulnerable to Goodman-style objections. Now consider TT2. Many
trope theorists seem to find bare particulars either unacceptably mysterious
or plainly incoherent. Nevertheless, accepting substrata along with tropes
is precisely what Michael LaBossiere (1994) and C. B. Martin (1980) seem
to recommend, arguably for reasons similar to the ones considered here.
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Of course, to do so is to give up on the dream of a mono-category ontology.
In sum, with respect to the task of ‘thing construction,’ module tropes and
modifier tropes have different strengths and weaknesses. Conflating the
two types of tropes has obscured the challenges facing each.
2.2 Challenges concerning the construction of property classes
In this section, I will consider how the distinction between module tropes
and modifier tropes bears on a second issue that has been central to the
development of trope theory: the construction of property classes. On trope
theory, a property class is a resemblance class of tropes, where membership
in the class is defined in terms of degrees of resemblance. More specifically,
a class ! of tropes is a property class iff (1) each member of ! resembles
every other member of ! to some specific degree, and (2) no trope that is
not a member of ! resembles every member of ! to that degree (Manley
2002: 77). According to Williams and Campbell, property classes of tropes
can provide the semantic values for abstract terms while avoiding both the
occult universals of the realist and the powerful objections raised by Nelson
Goodman against object-class resemblance nominalism. Thus, property
classes play an important role in trope theory, a role described by David
Manley as follows: ‘In general, whenever we have irreducible need for
reference to (or quantification over) a property, there is a class of objects
called a “property class” suited to be the subject of our discourse’ (2002: 75).
As we will see, however, the choice between module tropes and modifier
tropes bears significantly on whether and how trope theory might be
immune to Goodman’s objections. Indeed, we will see that a module
trope theory is more vulnerable to these objections than a modifier trope
theory – but opting for modifier tropes comes with significant costs.
To show this, I will consider David Manley’s challenge to the claim that
the property classes of the trope theorist are immune to Goodman’s objec-
tions. Because space is limited, my aims are as well. My intention is nei-
ther to present all of Manley’s arguments nor to assess any of them in a
comprehensive way. Instead, I will discuss the arguments for which the
distinction between module tropes and modifier tropes is most relevant.
We will see that Manley seems unaware of this distinction. He takes the
tropes of Stout, Williams, and Campbell to be thinly-charactered objects,
or module tropes. However, the tacit assumption that tropes are module
tropes is not innocuous – it is a crucial premise in most of his objections
to trope theory. Moreover, we will see that there are reasons to doubt that
Manley’s objections would be as forceful if retooled to fit modifier tropes.
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The primary target of Manley’s objections is what he calls the ‘standard’
version of trope theory, on which both of the following hold:
(i) Every trope is a determinate trope.
(ii) Property-classes are resemblance classes of tropes and not all property-
classes are constructed out of exactly-resembling tropes; some are
formed out of inexact or loose resemblance. (Manley 2002: 82)
In taking the standard view to accept (i), Manley seems to have in mind
what Campbell says is a ‘well accepted’ principle:
Principle of Absolute Determinateness (PAD): ‘Nothing can have a deter-
minable character without possessing exactly one fully determinate feature
[under that determinable] . . . ’ (1990: 83–84)
Campbell does not add the bracketed qualification, but presumably, it was
tacit; without it, PAD would preclude everything from having more than
one fully determinate character. PAD expresses the intuitive idea that noth-
ing has the merely determinable characteristic of, say, being colored unless
it has some fully determinate shade of color, such as crimson blue. This
is an extremely plausible principle. What is interesting is that Campbell
takes PAD to bear not just on ordinary concrete objects but on tropes as
well. From PAD he infers that ‘there are . . . no free-floating determinables’
(1990: 84), clearly meaning to affirm what we might call the
Absolute Determinateness of Tropes (ADT): Only fully determinate tropes
exist; there are no merely determinable tropes.
The acceptance of ADT is what makes a version of trope theory ‘standard,’
in Manley’s terms.
But notice that PAD entails ADT only if tropes are construed as mod-
ule tropes. PAD bans entities that have a merely determinable character.
Campbell is clearly thinking that a merely determinable trope, such as ‘an
instance of color’ would itself have to be colored but somehow not colored
in any specific way. It would be colored, but somehow neither scarlet, nor
crimson blue, nor (etc.). Thus, in rejecting merely determinable tropes,
Campbell is clearly working with the concept of a module trope.
Manley also thinks of tropes in this way. Throughout his paper, it is
obvious that he thinks of tropes as thinly-charactered objects. This is clear
in his objections and also from how he describes his examples of tropes
(2002: 84–85):! Some color tropes are reddish, some are bluish, and some are pale.! Where A is shape trope of an equilateral triangle, A is itself equilateral.
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as well as an interior right angle.
To be sure, Manley is interpreting Campbell and Williams in a rea-
sonable way. As indicated above, the thematic concept for both of these
philosophers is that of a module trope. Thus, as they stand, Manley’s
objections are aimed at the module trope theorist. In what follows, I will
consider whether the modifier trope theorist can dodge or at least resist
Manley’s objections.
Manley’s first Goodman-style objection is the Companionship Problem
(CP):
[T]he essence of CP is that resemblance classes conflate attributes that are
intuitively distinct . . . Standard trope theory falls prey to a version of CP
that concerns coextension between specific and general attributes. Consider
a possible world where all objects are red. Here the class of colored tropes and
the class of red tropes coincide exactly. In the actual world, of course, they do
not, so the trope theorist seems to have succeeded in distinguishing redness
from coloredness. In a restricted possible world, however, these collapse into
the same property. But they are necessarily distinct properties, since things
can be colored without being red. (2002: 82–83)
Call this restricted possible world ‘Ruby.’ Notice that in Ruby, PAD by
itself does not entail that there is only one property class and thus a com-
panionship problem. Rather, it is ADT that ensures that there is only one
property class. In other words, Ruby presents a companionship problem
only if there cannot be determinable tropes.
Notice, however, that a modifier trope theorist who accepts PAD can
consistently deny ADT. For example, she could, consistent with PAD, take
Ruby to contain both redness tropes and coloredness tropes. The existence
of a coloredness modifier trope is consistent with PAD because they are
not colored at all; a coloredness trope is not colored, just as a redness
trope is not red and a sphericalness trope is not spherical. In this way, the
modifier trope theorist can takeRuby to contain both fully-determinate and
determinable tropes, in which case there would be the requisite diversity of
property classes, and so no companionship problem.Of course, such a trope
theorist will be accused of populating her ontology with superfluous items.
This accusation may have some merit to it. But, because the introduction
of determinables is also a natural response to Manley’s next objection
(the imperfect community), I will postpone discussion of the superfluity
charge. For now it will suffice to note that if determinable module tropes
are incoherent, then the module trope theorist does not even have the
option of being extravagant in this way.
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Manley presents the problem of the Imperfect Community (IC) as follows:
[T]he essence of IC is that the criterion for the construction of resemblance
classes fails adequately to gather all and only things with a certain property
together . . . Consider a world with only three objects: an equilateral triangle,
a square, and a right triangle. (For simplicity’s sake, they are planar figures.)
Let the letters ‘A,’ ‘B,’ and ‘C’ name the shape tropes of these objects,
respectively. On standard trope theory, A will stand in various resemblance
classes, one for each property that can be applied to the equilateral triangle.
So the property triangularity should be a class of loosely resembling tropes,
one of which is A. (The same should be true of equilaterality and shapedness.)
Now, intuitively each of these shape tropes resembles every other one: A and
B are both equilateral; A and C are both triangular; B and C each have
perpendicular sides (and an interior angle). None of these tropes, however,
shares any of the relevant attributes with both of the others. So none of the
shared properties can be constructed as a property class out of only two of
the shape tropes in this world. (2002: 82, 84–85)
The world Manley describes has three objects in it, so call it ‘Trio.’ In
Trio, because every trope resembles the other two to the same (loose)
degree, there is exactly one resemblance class and it has tropes A, B, and
C as members. Thus, there is no suitable property class for (to play the
role of ) triangularity, nor for equilaterality or perpendicularness. Thus, the
problem for standard trope theory is that its ‘conditions for constructing
resemblance classes’ are not sufficient to produce the requisite property
classes (2002: 85).
Manley considers the following ‘tempting reply’:
Posit tropes at every level of generality. Accordingly, take A, B, and C to
each be a complex construction out of more fundamental tropes. Take A,
for example, to be constructed out of ‘a triangularity, an equilaterality, and
many more such tropes, since we found that A could resemble other shape
tropes in many different ways. (2002: 85)11
Notice that this view posits determinable tropes, thereby rejecting ADT
(and so is not a ‘standard’ version of trope theory). This reply also would
work for the Companionship Problem, since on this view Ruby would
contain both determinate and determinable tropes, in which case there
would be the requisite diversity of property classes.
Against the above reply, Manley raises the charge of superfluity. ‘[I]f
there is a trope for squareness, it would seem superfluous to have tropes for
rectangularity and quadrilaterality as well’ (2002: 85). By way of a response,
I wishmainly to point to how the superfluity charge presents a different and
11 Manley calls this ‘Abundant TRN’ (TRN is for ‘trope resemblance nominalism’).
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arguably greater challenge for a module trope theorist than for a modifier
trope theorist.
To begin, it is worth noting that the notion of a merely determinable
module trope appears to be incoherent. If so, then themodule trope theorist
forecloses on exploring the potential importance and use of determinable
tropes. Notwithstanding this point, the superfluity charge would seem to
have different force on each kind of trope theory. Consider the square
(concrete object) that exists in Trio. Call it ‘Quad.’ Quad is a bundle of
tropes. If there are determinable module tropes, then it would seem that
there is amultiplication of shaped objects, all falling at different places along
the hierarchy under the determinable ‘shaped’ and all located where Quad
is located. Within Quad, for example, there would be a shaped-thing,
a rectangular-thing, and a square-thing; these are non-identical objects.
Thus, where Quad is, there would be a multitude of shaped objects –
not exact duplicates, but, so to speak, duplicates of varying degrees of
resolution. That would be superfluity of a rather bizarre stripe. Postulating
determinable modifier tropes does not have this result. If there are such
tropes, the only shaped object in Quad’s region is the fully-determinately
shaped Quad. There would be no multiplication of shaped objects.
My aim here is neither to provide a comprehensive response to Manley
nor to argue that a trope theorist must posit determinable modifier tropes.
Rather, the point is this. With respect to the project of constructing prop-
erty classes, the Companionship and Imperfect Community Problems pose
significantly greater challenges for module trope theory than for modifier
trope theory. The choice between module tropes and modifier tropes is a
significant one.
3. Conclusion
The distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes throws into
relief two fundamentally different versions of trope theory and brings into
focus unique challenges facing each. With respect to the project of thing-
construction, a modifier trope theorist faces significant pressure to abandon
the bundle theory of substance and adopt a poly-category ontology that
includes both tropes and substrata. Conversely, the aspiration for a mono-
category ontology, or bundle theory, is better realized by taking tropes to
be primitively charactered, thereby adopting a module trope theory. With
respect to the project of constructing property-classes, it is precisely the
assumption that tropes are module tropes that gives rise to the imperfect
community and companionship problems. Amodifier trope theory is better
Trim: 228mm × 152mm Top: 11.774mm Gutter: 18.98mm
CUUK2866-06 CUUK2866/Galluzzo ISBN: 978 1 107 10089 3 March 3, 2015 12:6
Is trope theory a divided house? 155
equipped to meet these challenges. In this way, the distinction between
modifier tropes and module tropes calls into question an alleged advantage
of trope theory: that by occupying the middle ground between its rival
mono-category constituent ontologies – austere nominalism and realist
bundle theory – trope theory uniquely incorporates the strengths and
avoids the weaknesses of those views. Upon closer inspection, the trope
theory is a divided house.12
12 An ancestor of this chapter was presented as ‘Tropes and Tropers’ at The Problem of Universals in
Contemporary Philosophy: An International Conference on Ontology, Scuola Normale Superiore,
Pisa, Italy, July 7, 2010. I have numerous friends to thank for their help with this paper. Most
especially, I am grateful to Michael Loux – without his support, encouragement, and philosophical
guidance, this paper would never have been born. I am also grateful to the other participants
in the above conference, including Sophie Gibb, John Heil, E. J. Lowe, Fraser MacBride, Alex
Oliver, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Peter van Inwagen, and Dean Zimmerman. For many hours
of profitable discussion, I thank Jose´ Toma´s Alvarado, Robert Koons, Chris Menzel, and Timothy
Pickavance. Finally, I thank the two reviewers of the manuscript for their many helpful suggestions.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Peter van Inwagen, and Dean Zimmerman. For many hours of profitable
discussion, I thank Jose´ Toma´s Alvarado, Robert Koons, Chris Menzel, and Timothy Pickavance.
Finally, I thank the two reviewers of the manuscript for their many helpful suggestions.
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• On!page!x,!in!the!first!paragraph,!“Gonzala”!should!be!“Gonzalo”.!
• On!page!6,!line!14:!!I!think!this!misrepresents!what!Heil!says.!!In!fact,!I!
spoke!on!the!phone!with!Heil!about!this!and!he!confirmed!that!he!takes!
Williams!to!have!module!tropes!and!not!modifier!tropes.!!Thus,!on!line!14,!
“modifier”!should!be!replaced!with!“module”.!!That!is,!it!should!say!that!
Heil!understands!Williams’!tropes!as!what!Garcia!calls!module!tropes.!
!
Chapter$6$“Is$theory$a$divided$house?”:$
!
• On!page!134,!footnote!1:!!“molnar”!needs!to!be!(capitalized!as)!“Molnar”.!
• On!page!136,!footnote!5:!!“molnar”!needs!to!be!(capitalized!as)!“Molnar”.!
• On!page!140,!in!Box!1!of!the!figure:!!“ParticularPobjects”!should!be!(put!in!
the!singular!as)!“ParticularPobject”.!
• On!page!140,!in!Box!3!of!the!figure:!!“UniversalPobjects”!should!be!(put!in!
the!singular!as)!“UniversalPobject”.!
• On!page!142,!line!2!(from!top):!“where!that!sphericity!is!not!itself!spherical.”!
should!be!“where!that!trope!is!not!itself!spherical.”!
• On!page!142,!in!the!indented!quotation:!!should!the!exact!page!number!
(page!31!in!proofs)!be!provided!for!this!quotation?!!I.e.,!should!the!
quotation!end!with!“(Chapter!1,!page!31,!this!volume)”?!
• On!page!143,!line!1!(from!top):!“MS!a”!should!be!“2014b”.!
• On!page!144,!second!to!the!last!line!in!the!main!text:!!Currently!it!says!“In!
the!first!two!sections!of!section!2!I!will!argue”.!!But!this!phrase!is!erroneous,!
since!there!are!only!two!sections!in!section!2.!!So,!please!replace!the!
misleading!phrase!with!“In!this!section!my!aim!is!to!show”.!
• On!page!144,!footnote!7:!!In!line!5!of!the!footnote,!the!parenthetical!
comment!“(more!on!this!below)”!is!a!false!promise.!!Please!replace!it!with!
“(see!Garcia!MS!b)”.!
• On!page!144,!footnote!7:!!In!line!6!of!the!footnote,!“Orbois”!should!be!“Orbo!
is”.!
• On!page!145,!in!the!last!sentence!of!the!first!paragraph!under!section!2.1:!!
“that”!should!be!deleted.!!That!is,!please!replace!“and!that!these!challenges”!
with!“and!these!challenges”.!!!
• On!page!147,!footnotes!9!and!10:!!Somehow!these!footnotes!got!out!of!order.!!
Thus,!the!(complete)!text!in!these!footnotes!should!be!swapped!as!follows:!
o Footnote!9,!which!appears!in!the!main!text!after!“in!this!way.”!should!
say!“Sellars!argues…”.!
o Footnote!10,!which!appears!in!the!main!text!after!“the!coherence!of!
bare!particulars.”!should!say!“For!a!defense,!see!Garcia…”.!
• On!page!148,!line!17!(from!top):!!the!letter!“a”!should!be!inserted!between!
“is”!and!“non)shareable/property”!to!yield!“is!a!non)shareable/property”.!
• On!page!149,!there!is!a!crucial!mistake!in!items!“(TT1)”!and!“(TT2)”.!!There!
needs!to!be!a!comma!after!the!second!occurrence!of!“trope”!in!each.!!The!
corrected!versions!should!read!like!this:!
o (TT1)!!Taking!tropes!to!be!module!tropes,!unaccompanied!by!bare!
particulars.!
o (TT2)!!Taking!tropes!to!be!modifier!tropes,!accompanied!by!bare!
particulars.!!!
• On!page!152,!line!13P14!(from!the!bottom):!!“The!existence!of!a!coloredness!
modifier!trope”!should!be!“The!existence!of!coloredness!modifier!tropes”.!
• On!page!153,!in!the!second!indented!text,!beginning!with!“Posit!tropes…”:!!A!
closing!quotation!mark!is!needed!in!the!last!line!between!“ways.”!and!
“(2002:!85)11”!!In!other!words,!the!last!line!of!the!indented!text!should!be!
this:!!!“tropes!in!many!different!ways.’!(2002:!85)11”!!!(FYI,!the!quotation!
begins!in!the!third!line!of!the!indented!text:!!‘a!triangularity,!an…).!
• On!page!155,!last!sentence!of!main!text:!!please!delete!“the”.!!The!last!
sentence!should!be!“Upon!closer!inspection,!trope!theory!is!a!divided!
house.!12”!
• On!page!155,!footnote!12:!!The!last!three!complete!lines!of!the!footnote!
should!be!deleted!(they!are!fragments!and!copies!of!earlier!parts!of!the!
footnote).!!!
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• On!page!218,!under!“Garcia,!R.”,!there!are!two!listings!of!“Tropes!and!
Tropers”.!!!
o Please!keep!the!first!listing!that!reads!“2010.!‘Tropes!and!Tropers,’!
unpublished!paper.”!
o Please!delete!the!second!listing!that!reads!“‘Tropes!and!Tropers,’!
unpublished!paper.”!
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